Office of Administrative Hearings by Brown, Arthur L.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 29
Issue 4 June 1944 Article 5
Office of Administrative Hearings
Arthur L. Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arthur L. Brown, Office of Administrative Hearings, 29 Cornell L. Rev. 461 (1944)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol29/iss4/5
THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
ARTHUR L. BROWNt
In January, 1941, in less turbulent days, the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure, after nearly two years of investigation,
submitted a well-considered report recommending certain changes looking
toward improvement in federal administrative procedure.1 One of the im-
portant recommendations of that committee was that the adjudicating func-
tion be separated from other administrative activities. 2 The administrative
method of dealing with controversies had been sharply criticized on, the
ground that it merged the functions of prosecutor, judie, and jury, thereby
disregarding the familiar principle that no man should be a judge in his
own cause. Although the allegations were far more sweeping than the
actual facts warranted, 3 it was felt by the committee that the creation of
separate hearing commissioners within an agency, insulated from the rest
of the agency, would insure that impartiality which is, and should be, the
keystone of the administration of justice.
The Office of Price Administration was the first federal agency to put
into operation on a large scale many of the improvements suggested by the
Attorney General's Committee. On February 8, 1943, there was created
in that agency an Office of Administrative Hearings empowered to deter-
mine whether a person had violated the rationing regulations, and, in proper
cases, to issue suspension orders for such violations.4 This office is headed
by a hearing administrator in Washington, who has a small staff to assist
him. In addition, in each of the eight regional offices throughout the United
States there is a chief hearing commissioner with one or more associate
hearing commissioners. The chief function of the Office of Administrative
Hearings is to maintain an efficient and impartial administrative mechanism
for the orderly determination of charges of violations of rationing regula-
tions and to insure a complete separation bf prosecution from adjudication.
In all suspension order proceedings, the Office of Administrative Hearings
iThe expressions of opinion herein contained are those of the author, and may not
therefore be represented as necessarily reflecting either official Office of Price Adminis-
tration opinion or the opinion of the Board of Editors of the QUARTERLY.
*All references to administrative decisions, unless otherwise noted, are to the deci-
sions of the hearing administrator.
lFinal Report of the Attorney Genteral's Committee on Administrative Procedure
(1941) United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.2 1d. at 55 et seq.
3 GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941) 16 et seq.
4 General Order No. 46, 8 FED. REG. 1771 (1943).
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preserves this complete separation of functions and authority from the En-
forcement Division of the Office of Price Administration. When this organi-
zation was set up, it was believed that by its operation suspension order
proceedings would be conducted by competent officials, acting in as impar-
tial a manner as human nature would permit. Such an organization, it was
felt, divorcing adjudication from prosecution, in fact as well as in theory,
would allay the fear that suspension orders were issued by those who had
an interest in the investigation and in the institution of the proceedings.
Criticism of this experiment in administrative justice was to have been
expected and criticism there has been. 'the nature and source of the
criticism require scrutiny. A congressional committee, the so-called Smith
Committee, charges that the organizational set-up is such that "the Office
of Price Administration has established its own judiciary along with prose-
cuting attorneys and a constabulary." It refers to the hearing commissioners
as "courts" and a "pseudo judiciary."5 It adds that, "The establishment of
a system of 'courts' within the Office of Price Administration was all that
was necessary to make of it a complete government, inasmuch as it already
exercised executive and legislative powers. The agency recognizes this to
be true as may be readily seen from its efforts'to achieve a separation of
powers along constitutional lines."6 This criticism takes a strange turn. Had
there been no separation of adjudicatory and prosecuting functions, the
ominous spectre of judge-jury-prosecutor, rolled into one, would have been
trotted out. Instead, when a federal agency seeks to remove all doubt as
to a combination or blending of functions of prosecution and adjudication
to the end of guaranteeing, so far as possible, impartiality in decisions, it
is criticized for attempting to create a system of "courts." It may be inferred
that this frontal attack on the Office of Administrative Hearings is merely
the prelude to a major assault by opponents of the administrative process.
In a well-considered opinion in Perkins v. Brown,7 it was said:
The Hearing Commissioner and Hearing Administrator have not
presumed to act as judges in the sense of the Constitution but have con-
ducted themselves as delegates of the Administrator in determining
whether an allocation away from a violator on the conditions imposed
upon dealers in a war-scarce commodity is necessary or appropriate in
the public interest and to promote the national defense. The Adminis-
trato,r has delegated to officers; divorced, as 'I understand it, from the
5 Second Intermediate Report of the Select Committee to Investigate Executive
Agencies, H. R. REP. No. 862, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943) 14.6 d. at 15.
7Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176, OPA SERVICE 621:61 (S. D. Ga. 1943).
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-customary enforcement functions of his agency, his duty to withdraw
allocations from persons who have shown themselves to be irresponsible
or untrustworthy. . . He has likewise set up an administrative pro-
cedure to accord a full and fair hearing for persons charged with viola-
tions of the conditions of their eligibility to continue dealing in rationed
goods. This he has done so that an equitable system of allocation shall
not work inequitably as to a particular individual. In the exercise of
this function there is no exercise of the "judicial" powers of the United
States.
Contrast the approach of the Smith Committee with that employed by
Roscoe Pound, former Dean of the Harvard Law School, whose expressed
views on administrative'justice do not display the dispassionate, objective
approach of his writipgs on the history of jurisprudence. Says Dean Pound:
Yet the regime in which complaint is made to an administrative agency
which takes it up, investigates it, orders a hearing before itself on the
complaint it has made its own, advocates it at the hearing by its own
counsel before one of its staff as a trial examiner or hearing commis-
sioner, and renders an order depriving some individual of a valuable
right, amounts in practice to the agency judging its own case. Emo-
tional interest in the result precludes objective and impartial action as
surely as the pecuniary interest which has always been held to disqualify.
The procedure of the OPA, as set forth in the San Francisco report, is
but one more illustration of the vice of combining the functions of
investigation, prosecuting, and judging in one administrative organi-
zation.8
It would seem that Dean Pound failed to go to original sources, basing
his conclusions on a committee report of the San Francisco Bar Association
to which further reference will be made. His conclusions apparently result
also from the mistaken belief that Hearing Commissioners "are appointees
of the OPA and must take their orders from it, whereas judges are made
independent, subject only to review of their judgments and orders."
I can state without equivocation that since the Office of Administrative
Hearings was set up an order has never been received by a hearing com-
missioner of Region I, either from the hearing administrator or from anyone
connected with the Office of Price Administration, concerning the disposition
of any case brought before a hearing commissioner for determination. I am
confident that no order has ever been issued to any other hearing commis-
sioner throughout the United States. That the hearing commissioners have
succeeded in being impartial is illustrated by the fact that they have not
SPound, The Challenge of the Administrative Process (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 121, 124.
91d. at 122.
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infrequently been criticized by attorneys in the Office of Price Administra-
tino for dismissing cases on the ground that the government had not sus-
tained the burden of proof. They have been charged by various enforcement
attorneys with an over-zealous regard for the rights of the respondent in
subjecting the Government to what appeared to them to be too exacting
standards and requirements.
Another basis of attack indulged in by the San Francisco Bar Association
Committee, and presumably endorsed by Dean Pound, is that the Office
of Administrative Hearings is not a legally constituted agency, and that
therefore the orders of hearing commissioners suspending, violators of the
rationing regulations are unconstitutional. 10
The suspension power of the Office of Price Administration originates
in the Second War Powers Act which provides:
Whenever the President is satisfied that the fulfillment of require-
ments for the defense of the United States will result in a shortage in
the supply of any material or of any facilities for defense or for private
account or for export, the President may allocate such material or facili-
ties in such manner, upon such conditions and to such extent as he shall
deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to promote the
national defense."
The power of allocation has positive and negative aspects. What is allo-
cated to some is allocated away from others. An order is equally an alloca-
tion whether it prescribes what A shall receive, or, as in the case of a sus-
pension order, what B shall not receive.1 2 By successive executive orders
and directives the President has lodged in the "Office of Price Administration
the power granted to him by the Second War Powers Act to allocate vital
materials necessary in the war effort, upon the conditions and to the extent
deemed necessary. On May 22, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United
States held, in L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, et al.,"3 that the power
to allocate, vested in the President by the Second War Powers Act, includes
the power to reallocate or, put an end to allocations and the power to sus-
pend the right of a violator of the rationing regulations to deal in the
3OSan Francisco Bar Association, Committee Report on the Office of Administrative
Hearings of the Office of Price Administration (December 1943) 6-8; 27-29. An effective
and documented answer to the criticism of the San Francisco Bar Association Report
was made in the report of the San Francisco Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild,
on the Office of Administrative Hearings of the Office of Price Administration.
"156 STAT. 178, 50 U. S. C. (Appendix) § 633 [2(a) (2)] (Supp. 1942).
12L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 140 F.' (2d) 703, OPA SERVICE 621:103
(App. D. C. 1944). -
1312 U. S. L. Week 4406 (U. S. 1944).
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rationed commodity. Two circuit court of appeals and the Court of Appeals
fo" the District of Columbia,1 4 as well as numerous federal district courts,
had previously rendered decisions of similar tenor and effect. 15
It has been charged that, as a suspension is a penalty or punishment, the
suspension order proceeding is a penal proceeding and as such is not author-
ized by law. The Smith Committee, throughout its report, uses the tradi-
tional vocabulary of criminal law: "crime," "penalty," "punishment," "double
jeopardy,"' "conviction," "sentence," and "guilt." This mistaken attitude
towards suspension order proceedings springs from a basic misconception of
their purpose. In suspending an allocation, the administrator is carrying out
his duty to allocate scarce materials. In holding hearings before he takes
such action, he is taking a praiseworthy precaution against hasty or ill-
founded administrative action. The primary purpose of the suspension order
is not to penalize, but to remedy a disruption in the allocation program and
to correct an improper diversion in the flow of scarce commodities occa-
sioned by the violator's misuse. As stated by the court in Brown v.
Wileinon :1o
Punishment or penalty in America consists in taking life, liberty or
property. A suspension order takes neither. The dealer's personal liberty
is untouched. Nothing that is really his is taken from him. His filling
station is unmolested and may be used to sell things other than gasoline,
and to service cars. Even his gasoline is not taken from him. He is
prohibited for a brief period from distributing it or from getting any
more. There is damage by the interruption of his business, but damnum
14Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944), rev'g Wilemon v. Brown,
51 F. Supp. 978 (D. C. N. D. Texas, 1943); L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles,
140 F. (2d) 703, OPA SERVICE 621:102 (App. D. C. 1944), aff'g L. P. Steuart & Bro.,
Inc. v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA SERVICE 621:93 (D. C. 1944); The Country
Garden Market, Inc. v. Bowles, - F. (2d) -, OPA SERVICE 621:113 (App. D. C.
1944), aff'g The Country Garden Market Inc. v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA SER ICE
621:111 (D. C. 1944); Gallagher's Steak House, Inc. v. Bowles, et al., - F. (2d) -,
OPA SERVICE 621:128 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944).
.
5Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176, OPA SERVICE 621:56 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; Panteleo
v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. N. Y. 1943) ; Joliet Oil Corporation v. Brown, - F.
Supp. -, OPA SERVICE 621:68 (N. D. Ill. 1943) ; Gallagher's Steak House v. Bowles,
- F. Supp. -, OPA SERVIcE 621:81 (S. D. N. Y. 1943); Means v. Nelson, Bowles
et al., - F. Supp. -, OPA SERVICE 621:95 (R. I. 1944) ; Kotsos v. Ivins et al., OPA
SERVICE 621:114 (D. Utah 1944); Central West Oil Co. et al. v. Bowles, - F. Supp.
-, OPA SERVICE 621:121 (W. D. Mich. 11944); LaPorte et al. v. Bitker et al., - F.
Supp. -, OPA SERVICE 621:122 (E. D. Wis. 1944). See also Schwarzmann v. Brown,
- F. Supp. -, OPA SERVICE 621:43 (D. C. 1943). Contra: Sims v. Talbert, 52 F.
Supp. 688 (E. D. S. C. 1943) ; Jacobson et al. v. Bowles et al., 53 F. Supp. 532 (N. D.
Tex. 1944) ; Frank v. Bowles, - F. Supp. - (S. D. N. Y. 1944), OPA, SERVIc E 621:134.
16139 F. (2d) 730, 732 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
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absque injuria. His private interest has merely come into collision with
a public interest, and has had to yield.
Another court has stated:
A penalty is a punishment, an injury inflicted for punitive purposes.
Appellant's suspension is undoubtedly an injury, but is not imposed for
punitive purposes. It is a diiect means to a fairer distribution of the
limited supply of oil in accordance with the allocation program ...
But instead of seeking to punish, the government sought to prevent.
The suspension order is intended to limit, and does limit, appellant's
temptation and opportunity to violate the rationing program. The order
therefore tends, in a most direct way, to promote the program. No doubt
it tends also to promote the program in an indirect way by indicating
that violation may not pay. But an incidental minatory effect does not
turn a remedial order into a penal one. The fact that the suspension
order protects the public directly, by allocating oil away from a 'dealer
who is disposed to violate the rationing program and toward other deal-
ers, sharply distinguishes it from fines and penalties.
17
In sustaining a fuel oil suspension order, the Supreme Court of the United
States in L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, et al., said :17'
The suspension order rests on findings of serious violations repeated-
ly made. These violations were obviously germane to the problem of
allocation of fuel oil. For they indicated that a scarce and vital com-
modity was being distributed in an inefficient, inequitable and wasteful
way. The character of the violations thus negatives the charge that the
suspension order was designed to punish petitioner rather than to pro-
tect the distribution system and the interests of conservation.
No power is given to hearing commissioners to punish violators by imposi-
17L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, 140 F. (2d) 703, 704. OPA SMavIcE 621:104
(App. D. C. 1944). Accord: Joliet Oil Corporation v. Brown, - F. Supp. -, OPA
SERVICE 621:70 (N. D. Ill. 1943); Brown v. Wilemon, 139 F. (2d) 730 (C. C. A. 5th,
1944) ; Means v. Nelson, Bowles et al., - F. Supp. -, OPA SERVIcE 621:96 (R. I.
1944); The Country Garden Market, Inc. v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA SEavIcE
621:112 (D. C. 1944) ; Central West Oil Co. et al. v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA
SERvIcE 621:121 (W. D. Mich. 1944). The hearing administrator consistently held that
suspension proceedings were not criminal in nature and that a suspension order was
not punishment or a penalty. Matter of Vittoria Castle, Inc., Docket No. 17 SG 5
N. Y. (June 24, 1943); Matter of Oyster Bay, Incorporated, Docket No. 2-32 A
(August 2, 1943) ; Matter of Salkin and Linoff, Docket No. 6-56 A (October 8, 1943) ;
Matter of Manfredi, Docket No. 2-329 A (October 18, 1943); Matter of Montesi,
Docket No. 4-111 A (October 25, 1943) ; Matter of Lingo, Docket No. 8-119 A (Novem-
ber 1, 1943) ; Matter of Schubert, Docket No. 6-147 A (December 15, 1943) ; Matter of
Ginns, Docket No. 2-1265 A (December 18, 1943) ; Matter of Montgomery Ward and
Company, Docket No. 7-80 A (January 4, 1944) ; Matter of Passell, Docket No. 2-1212
A (March 7, 1944).
17,12 U. S. L. Week 4406 (U. S. 1944).
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tion of fines or sentences. Such punitive action is reserved to the courts.1s
Another fact demonstrating that suspension orders are not issued as punish-
ment, but rather to withhold allocations of scarce commodities from untrust-
worthy dealers, is that such orders do not remain effective when a commodity
ceases to be rationed. Thus, when coffee became a nonrationed commodity,
coffee suspension orders were lifted. No necessity remained for the con-
tinuance of a nonallocation order.
The fact that a suspension order may cause financial loss does not convert
it into a penalty.' 9 Merely because a remedial order has penalizing conse-
quences does not change the essential character of the order. For example,
administrative orders expelling individuals from a securities exchange20 or
prohibiting trading on a commodity exchange2 ' are not deemed penalties but
a means of protecting investors. Likewise, revocations of licenses have been
deemed remedial measures to protect the public interest, although they may
have collateral penalizing consequences.2 2
As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States:
From the- viewpoint of a rationing system a middleman who dis-
tributes the product in violation and disregard of the prescribed quotas
is an inefficient and wasteful conduit. If the needs of consumers are to
be met and the consumer allocations are to be filled, prudence might well
dictate the avoidance or discard of such inefficient and unreliable means
of distribution of a scarce and vital commodity. Certainly we could not
say that the President would lack the power under this Act to take away
from a wasteful factory and route to an efficient one a precious supply
of material needed for the manufacture of articles of war. That power
of allocation or rationing might indeed be the only way of getting the
right equipment to our armed forces in time. From the point of view
of -the factory owner from whom the materials were diverted the action
would be harsh. He would be deprived of an expected profit. But ih
times of war the national ixterest cannot wait on individual claims to
preference. The waging of war and the control of its attendant eco-
nomic problems are urgent business. Yet if the President has the power
to channel raw materials into the most' efficient industrial units and thus
18 Second War Powers Act, 56 STAT. 178, 50 U. S. C. (Appendix) § 633 [2(a) (5) (6)]
(Supp. 1942).
19Perkins v. Brown, 53 F. Supp. 176, OPA SERVicE 621:59 (S. D. Ga. 1943) ; The
Country Garden Market, Inc. v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA SERVIcE 621:113 (D. C.
1944); LaPorte et al. v. Bitker et al., - F. Supp. -, OPA SERVIcE 621:122 (E. D.
Wis. 1944); Gallagher's Steak House, Inc. v. Bowles, et al., - F. (2d) - (C. C. A.
2d, 1944), OPA SERVicE 621:128.
2OWright v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 112 F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
i'Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Wallace, 67 F. (2d) 402 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933);
Nichols & Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 131 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 1st, 1942).22Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573 (1898).
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save scarce materials from wastage it is difficult to see why the same
principle is not applicable to the distribution of fuel oil. 221
PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF ADmINISTRATIVE HEARINGS
The other charge levelled against the Office of Administrative Hearings
is that the hearings lack adequate procedural safeguards to protect the rights
of citizens. Some of such criticism displays an abysmal ignorance of the
governing regulation; some discloses a lack of appreciation of the actual
practice of the Office. A review of the procedure of the Office of Adminis-
trative Hearings will demonstrate that the Office, mindful of the serious
consequences of the issuance of a suspension order, has surrounded its
hearings and the issuance of such orders with safeguards which go far beyond
the mere requirements of due process of law and which guarantee to party
litigants the real essence of fairness.
All suspension proceedings are governed by a procedural regulation.23
Notice of Hearing: Contents.-Suspension order proceedings are com-
menced by the service of a notice of hearing upon a violator not less than
seven days before the date set for hearing.2 4 This provision was inserted
as a reasonable protection to the respondent, to give him sufficient time to
obtain counsel, marshal his facts for defense, obtain his witnesses and make
necessary arrangements to be present at the hearing. A respondent is en-
titled to that protection unless, for'some reason, he desires a more expeditious
hearing. The-appearance of a respondent without counsel at the time set
for hearing on less than the requisite notice is not deemed to be an implied
waiver of the procedural requirements.2 The notice sets forth the time and
place of hearing, a clear statement of the charges against the respondent
with reference to the particular section of the regulation or order alleged to
have been violated, and a statement of the purpose or purposes for which
the hearing is to be held.26 The San Francisco Bar Association Committee
charges that the notice does not give sufficient information about the nature
of the charge.2 7 Dean Pound adds, "This is very characteristic of adminis-
trative justice."2- No such laxity is permitted, however, by the Office of
22
'L. P. Steuart & Bro., Inc. v. Bowles, et al., 12 U., S. L. Week 4406 (U. S. 1944).
2Procedural Regulation No. 4, /8 FED. REG. 1744 (1943) has now been superseded
by Reirised Procedural Regulation No. 4, 9 FED. REG. 2558 (1944), hereinafter cited
Ray. P. R. 4.24REv. P. R. 4, § 2.1.25Matter of DeSpain, Docket No. 5-199 A (December 11, 1943).26REv. P. R. 4, § 2.2(a).
27Comrnittee Report on the Office of Adnihtistrative Hearings, Supra note 10, at 9.28Pound, supra noe 8, at 121, 122.
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Administrative Hearings. The hearing administrator has held :29
A notice of hearing should set forth the nature of the charges with
clearness and particularity. The details of the offense charged should
not be left to conjecture. The norm governing the contents of com-
plaints found in Rule No. 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the
District Courts of the United States, would undoubtedly be a safe
guide for the Enforcement Attorney. Our views in this respect in no
sense imply that the notice must be framed with such particularization
or technical language as would meet the test of a demurrer under canons
of pleading in the Courts, but we do mean . . .that the charge should be
definite, specific and particular, and sufficiently factual to bring the
person °charged within the ambit of the appropriate regulation. Every
respondent has the fundamental right to know the charges which have
been made against him and to prepare adequately his defense thereto..'..
It is sufficient to say, we believe, that a notice of hearing which merely
sets forth the language of a general prohibition section of a ration order,
is fatally defective because it does not sufficiently apprise a respondent
of the nature of the charges. made against him. In concept of law such a
notice fails "to state a cause of action." The fact that respondent, in
her ignorance of the law, admitted two of these three chaiges does not
alter our view of the improper form of the notice of hearing.30
A respondent may request specifications or particulars. 31 Amendments to
a notice of hearing may be made. If, however, a respondent claims surprise
by an amended charge, he is entitled to a continuance to give him adequate
opportunity to prepare his defense.32 Of course ne w parties cannot be added
by amendment without giving the requisite notice to such parties, unless
they voluntarily appear and waive notice.3 ,
Dean Pound says in addition, "It is not uncommon for these agencies to
have a hearing on ohe point and to make an order on another."3 4 The deci-
sions of the hearing administrator reveal that the settled rule afid practice
of the Office of Administrative: Hearings is entirely contrary to such a
practice.35
Defaidt for Failure to Appear.-The notice also states that a suspension
29Matter of Venzer, Docket No. 2-234 A (September 17, 1943).30Where the respondent, represented by counsel, proceeds without objection, the de-
fective form of notice is deemed waived. Matter of Falloon, Docket No. 7-26 A (Octo-
ber 5, 1943) ; Matter of Glick Brothers, Docket No. 2-461 A (October 29, 1943);
Matter of Schull, Docket No. 2-860 A (December 2, 1943). This is familiar practice
in courts of law.31Matter of Yellow Cab Transit Company, Inc., Docket No. 5-149 A (January 12,
1944).
32Ibid.33Matter of Kaplan's Meat Market, Dbcket No. 2-274 A (October. 28, 1943).34See note 28 supra.35Matter of Crabtree, Docket No. 4-495 A (January 8, 1944).
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order may be entered by default should the respondent fail to appear at the
hearing.36 In the event of such a failure to appear, the charges are deemed
to have been admitted by default, and a hearing need not be held. The
enforcement attorney of the Office of Price Administration, however, pre-
sents evidence relevant to the determination of the effective period of any
suspension order.37 At any time within ten days after service of an order
issued after a default, the respondent may file a petition to reopen the pro-
ceedings, setting forth the ground on which he believes his default should
be excused. If the hearing commissioner grants this petition, he enters an
order setting aside the default order and stating the time and place for a
hearing on the original notice of hearing.3 I
Alternative Form of Notice.-Formerly, it was provided that if the notice
of hearing was served at least ten days before the date set for the hearing,
the notice could provide that such hearing would be held only if the re-
spondent requested a hearing and made a statement of the general nature
of his defense to the charges.39 The notice in such cases provided that the
time for making the request and statement should be not less than five days
after service of the notice.40 Dean Pound, commenting on this section, says:
It will be noted that this procedure assumes that the case against the
respondent is established by one-sided investigation made in advance and
the hearing is merely an opportunity to disprove or avoid it. Here we
have the common lay idea, generally held by administrative agencies,
that charges are to be disproved by the respondent instead of proved by
the complainant.
41
It has been held consistently by the Office of Administrative Hearings that
the burden of proof is on the government and that it is not the duty of a
respondent'to prove his innocence of violations.42
To every notice of hearing served upon a violator, a copy of the pro-
cedural regulation governing the Office's procedure is attached. 43 Thus, both
the respondent and his counsel are fully apprised of all the means available
for the protection of his rights.
36REv. P. R. 4, § 2.2(a).37REv. P. R. 4, § 2.7(a).38REv. P. R. 4, § 2.7(b). Matter of Johnson, Docket No. 5-1 A (July 26, 1943);
Matter of Frelison, Docket No. 4-36 A (August 3, 1943).39REv. P. R. 4, § 2.2(b). This section was repealed by Amendment 1 to REv. P. R. 4,
9 FED. REG. 5426 (1944).
40REV. P. R. 4, § 2.2(b).41Pound, supra note 8 at 121, 123.42Matter of Sch~vartz, Docket No. 2-1140 A (December 17, 1943) ; Matter of Chick,
Docket No. 2-1296 A (March 6, 1944).
4 3 REv. P. R. 4, § 2.2(c).
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The Hearing: The Argurnent.-A hearing held pursuant to such notice
is conducted by a hearing commissioner or a presiding officer designated
by the chief hearing commissioner of the region. The hearing commissioner
presidles at the hearing, administers oaths and affirmations, and rules on
the admission or exclusion of evidence. 44 The regulation provides that the
hearing shall be so conducted as to permit the presentation of evidence and
argument to the fullest extent compatible with fair and expeditious deter-'
mination of the issues raised.45 .The respondent has the right to be repre-
sented by counsel of his own choosing.46 Reasonable opportunity for cross-
examination of witnesses is provided. 47 In this latter connection the hearing
administrator has said:
The right of cross-examination of opposing witnesses is one of the
basic elements of due process. Its complete denial to any party to a pro-
ceeding, whether judicial or administrative, is repugnant to our entire
conception of Anglo-American' jurisprudence. In the case before us,
respondent did not cross-examine the Government's witnesses, was never
given an opportunity to do so, and was not advised of her right in this
respect. Since she was not represented by counsel, there was an affirma-
tive duty upon the Hearing Commissioner and the Enforcement Attorney
to specifically ask her whether she had any questions for the witnesses,
and further to assist her in formulating and presenting any question she
might wish to-propound. Their failure to do so is clearly incompatible
with the standard of conduct not only expected but demanded of repre-
sentatives of the Government.
4
The Hearing: Rides of Evidence.-The rules of evidence governing civil
proceedings in matters not involving trial by jury in the courts of the United
44REv. P. R. 4, § 2.3(a).
45REv. P. R. 4, § 2.3(b).
4GREV. P. R. 4, § 2.3(b) (1) ; Matter of Lander, Docket No. 5 S 17 N. Y. (June 22,
1943).47 REv. P. R. 4, § 2.3(b) (2). In Matter of Blumberg, Docket No. 8-86 A (January 8,
1944), it was said, "Our procedures do not authorize the taking of testimony by depo-
sition, and, therefore, any testimony by a third party must be given, we think, at the
hearing with a reasonable opportunity afforded for cross-examination. The individual
is no less a witness when his testimony is offered in the form of a sworn statement
than when he is present and testifies in person. In many instances such statement is
not written by him. and often contains conclusions and opinions formed or entertained
by the person actually preparing the same. Under such circumstances it possibly would
not give a correct and accurate statement of the facts. Cross-examination would reveal
any weaknesses or inaccuracies and better enable the Commissioner to properly deter-
mine to what extent he could rely thereon. In our opinion, the right of reasonable
cross-examination afforded the respondent by the procedural regulations cannot be en-
forced and protected in any other way than by excluding the testimony unless the
person giving the same is available for cross-examination at the hearing."48Matter of Venzer, Docket No. 2-234 A (September 17, 1943).
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States govern all hearings, but such rules may be relaxed by the hearing
commissioner or presiding officer where the ends of justice will be. better
served by so doing.49 This rule permitting relaxation of the technical rules
of evidence when the ends of justice will be met is one common to nearly
every administrative tribunal. It is designed both to expedite and simplify
the proceedings 5° and to protect respondents, particularly those who are not
represented by counsel and are not familiar with these technical rules. Con-
siderable latitude is permitted such respondents in deviating from the strict
rules of evidence. Hearing commissioners require the government to estab-
lish a Primat facie case by legally competent evidence. Thus, the criticism
of the Smith Committee that "a defendant there tried is denied the protec-
tion afforded by the legal rules of evidence" 5' 1 is not justified.
Because suspension proceedings are civil in nature, rather than criminal,
the quantum of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.5 2 Mere speculation
cannot take the place of proof.5 3 Hearsay evidence, though admissible,5 4
is not favored.55 In no,event can a finding be based on uncorrobo'rated hear-
say56 or on evidence not of "the kind . . . on which responsible persons are
accustomed to rely in serious affairs.1
'5 7
Again Dean Pound says:
In administrative adjudication there is an obstinate tendency to decide
49REV. P. R. 4, § 2.4. The wording of this section of the procedural regulation is
identical with the phraseology employed in the Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Federal Communications Commission, § 1.211. PIKE & FIscHER, ADAIINISTRATIW
LAW (1941) vol. I. See also Report of the Attorney General's Committee, .mpra
note 1, at 70.5OReport of the Attorney General's Committee, supra note 1, at 70.51See note 5 supra.5 2Matter of Cordes, Docket No. 2-1291 A (January 22, 1944).53 Matter of Goldman, Docket No. 2-380 A (November 8, 1943); Matter of Howells,
Docket No. 7-67 A (March 10, 1944).5 4Matter of Ressler, Docket No, 2-17 A (July 26, 1943) ; Matter of Wolfe Smith Co.,
Inc., Docket No. 2-21 A (August 20, 1943) ; Matter of K. & J. Markets, Inc., Docket
No. 2-10 A (November 20, 1943).55 Matter of Esposito, Docket No. RI-S 122 (May 3, 1943) ; Matter of Morris Loew,
Inc., Docket No. 5 S 3 N. Y. (May 20, 1943).
P6 Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197, 59
Sup. Ct. 206 (1938). It was said in Matter of Blumberg, Docket No. 8-86 A (January 8,
1944), "The courts have considered 'and discussed the admissibility of hearsay evidence
in administrative proceedings such as this and the probative effect thereof and have
held that the mere reception in evidence of hearsay testimony does not necessitate a
reversal if the record 'contains other substantial unobjectionable testimony supporting
the facts found by the Commissioner. However, hearsay testimony consisting solely of
ex parte sworn statements of third parties does not afford a sound evidentiary basis
for finding a violation because same does not constitute substantial evidence."57 National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. (2d) 862 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938), cert. den. 304 U. S. 576, 585, 58 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1938).
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without a hearing, or without hearing one of the parties, or after con-
ferenc'e with one of the parties in the absence of the other, whose i)ter-
ests are adversely affected, or to treat the statutory requirement of a
hearing as a mere formality and act upon preformed opinions as to the
order to be made. Another closely related tendency is to make deter-
minations on the basis of ,reports not divulged, giving the party affected
no opportunity to refute or explain. Another is to make determinations
seriously affecting individual rights without a basis in evidence of rat-
tional probative force. s
A glance at the record will disclose that such charges are unfounded as
far as the Office of Administrative Hearings is concerned. A respondent has
a right to be confronted with the witnesses for the government.5 9 Ex parte
statements cannot be received in evidence. 0° If such statements are made to
a hearing commissioner in the form of a, letter after hearing has been con-
cluded, they must. either be disregarded or a rehearing ordered, giving all
parties a right to be present and to participate. 61 Secret evidence cannot be
considered, nor can a hearing commissioner make personal inquiies or indi-
vidual observations and substitute them for factual evidence adduced at the
hearing.
62
The Hearing: Who May Appear for Respondent.-Any individual' re-
spondent may appear for himself; any partner may appear for a partner-
shili if expressly or impliedly authorized to do so; and a corporation may
be represented by an officer thereof. Any respondent may appear by an
attorney.63 No other person may appear for a respondent unless specifically
authorized in writing by such respondent.6 4 Former employees of the Office
of Price Administration are not permitted to represent a respondent within
a period of one year after termination of their employment with that agency.65
58Pound, supra 'note 8, at 121, 123.
59See Matter of Hosti, Docket No. 4-410 A (December 9, 1943).60
"We are not unaware that the rule of evidence here set forth may vary somewhat
from the rule sometimes followed in other administrative proceedings. Irrespective of
this, however, we think the rule here enunciated is the proper one to be followed in
suspension order proceedings and we are unwilling to put the stamp of administrative
approval ulon a suspension order with all its collateral economic consequences upon
a respondent, when same is based upon no more substantial or probative evidence than
ex parte statements of third parties who were not present at the hearing and as to
whom no right of cross-examination was afforded." Matter of Blumberg, Docket No.
8-86 A (January 8, 1944).
G1Matter of Koceja, Docket No. 6-22 A (November 20, 1943) ; Matter of Kunlansky,
Docket No. 6-162 A (January 18, 1944).62Matter of Tramor Cafeteria, Docket No. 4-18 A (July 27, 1943).63REv. P. R. 4, § 2.5. Matter of Archers, Inc., Docket No. 3-260 A (November 12,
1943).64REv. P. R. 4, § 2.5. An employee, merely on his own assertion, cannot appear for
his employer. Matter of Celli, Docket No. 2-75 A (October 9, 1943).
6 5 PRoc. RE. No. 14, § 1300.701 (b).
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The Hearing: Tine and Place.-The hearing is held at a time and place
specified in the notice of hearing. The hearing commissioner or presiding
officer, however, may continue or adjourn the hearing to a later date or to
a different place; and notice of such adjournment or continuance is given
either prior to or at the hearing.66
The Hearing: Disciplinary Powers of Commissioner.-Any hearing com-
missioner may issue subpoenas compelling the attendance and testimony of
witnesses and the production of ,evidence at a hearing.67
Although administrative tribunals do not possess the power to punish for
contempt, the procedural regulation provides that contemptuous conduct
at any hearing shall be ground for exclusion from the hearing.
6 8
Report of the Hearing.-All hearings are reported stenographically. The
report is transcribed only if such transcription is iequested by a party to the
proceeding or by a hearing commissioner. Any party may obtain a copy
of the transcript, the cost being borne by the requesting party. If the steno-
graphic rep6rt is transcribed at the request of the hearing commissioner, or
the enforcement attorney of the Office of Price Administration, a copy of
such transcribed report is available for inspection without charge by the
respondent.69
Qualifications of Co'mmissioners.-Both the San Francisco Bar Associa-
tion Committee 70 and Dean Pound complain that there is "nothing in the
orders or regulations which requires the Hearing Commissioners . . . to be
lawyers or to have any particular qualifications." 71 From this premise Dean
Pound concludes, "When it is remembered that neither the hearing commis-
sioner nor the presiding officer need be a lawyer, and that questions are fre-
quently asked as to which there may be a legal or constitutional privilege,
as well as that the only available witness may be a hostile witness over
66REv. P. R. 4, § 2.6. Matter of Sears Roebuck & Company, Docket No. 4-355 A
(February 17, 1944); Matter of Jacobson, Docket No. 2-379 A (October 19, 1943).67 REv. P. R. 4, § 2 .8(a). Matter of Sears Roebuck and Company, Docket No.
4-355 A (February 17, 1944). The applicant for a subpoena specifies the name and
address of the witness and the nature of the facts to be proved by him, and, if calling
for the production of evidence, specifies the same with such particularity as will enable
it to be identified for purposes of 'production. REV. P. R. 4, § 2.8(b). Subpoenas are
served by delivering a copy to the person subpoenaed and tendering to him the same
fees and mileage as 4re paid witnesses in the district courts of the United States. Rv.
P. R. 4, § 2.8(c), 2.9. Witnesses' fees and mileage are paid by the party at whose
instance the witness appears. REv. P. R. 4, § 2.9.68 REv. P. R. 4, § 2.10.
69REv. P. R. 4, § 2.11. Matter of Byrne and Central Oil Co., Docket No. 1-125 A
(November, 9, 1943):
7OComntittee Report on Office of Administrative Hearings, suPra note 10, at 8.71Pound, supra note 8, at 121, 122.
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whose willingness to answer the respondent has no control, it will- be seen
that the right of the respondent to make a defense may be in effect wholly
denied." 72
The fact is that every hearing commissioner is required to be a member
of the bar and must meet the qualifications of the Boara of Legal Examiners
of the United States Civil Service Commission. 3  Contrast this with the
absence of a requirement that a member of the federal judiciary be a lawyer
or even pass the requirements of the Board of Legal Examiners.
Protection of Respondent's Rights.-More important is the charge that
constitutional or legal rights of a respondent may be invaded and that he
may be denied a right to make a defense. The hearing administrator in many
decisions has held that there is an affirmative duty on the part of a hearing
commissioner to advise an unrepresented respondent of his constitutional
rights; the privilege against giving testimony that might be the basis of a
subsequent criminal action against him, the right to be represented by coun-
sel, the right to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and the right of
cross-examination of the government's witnesses. 74 Indeed, it has been held
that there is an affirmative duty on the part of a hearing commissioner to
assist an unrepresented respondent in examining and cross-examining wit-
nesses in his behalf. It was said in Matter of Foster :75
Hearing Commissioners must, at all times, conduct these proceedings
in strict accordance with the established principles of due process bear-
ing in mind that it is their duty to see that all facts pertinent to a proper
and just determination of the matter are fully and fairly developed; going
72 d. at 123.
73The minimum qualifications for hearing commissioners established by the Civil
Service Commission require that they (1) must be members in good standing of the bar
of some state, District of Columbia or territory, preferably within the region; (2)
must have at least three years experience in the trial and argument of cases and
conduct of proceedings in the courts or before administrative agencies or have experience
as a judge, hearing commissioner, trial examiner, referee or special master; (3) must
be attorneys of maturity and .active in legal affairs in their community or state, and
through experience, personal standing, and reputation in the profession and community
command the respect of the profession and general public; (4) have a combination of
academic background and experience which enable them to understand the complexities
of problems of commodity control and rationing at all levels of production and dis-
tribution. Hearing commissioners are nominated by the hearing administrator and are
approved by the Board of Legal Examiners of the Civil Service Commission. A con-
venient summary of these qualifications is set forth in the Report on the Office of
Administrative Hearings of the Offlce of Price Administration, National Lawyers'
Guild, San Francisco Chapter, 32-33.
74Matter of Johnson, Docket No. 5-1 A (July 26, 1943) ; Matter of Venzer, Docket
No. 2-234 A (September 17, 1943) ; Matter of Arkin, Docket No. 2-227 A (October 9,
1943); Matter of Weinziner, Docket No. 2-89 A (November 18, 1943).
75 Ddcket No. 2-103 A (October 4, 1943).
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to the extent where necessary and respondent is not represented by
counsel, of questioning or cross-examining the witnesses or even calling
for additional witnesses or evidence. The Commissioner, as evidenced by
the record in this case, did not comply with these standards and where
such is the case, we are unwilling to permit a suspension order for even
three days to stand.
Presiding Offcers.-Provision is made in the procedural regulation for the
appointment of a presiding officer. Such presiding officers are used only when
the load of work of a particular office is such that proceedings cannot be
speedily determined by the regular personnel, or in cases where a hearing
commissioner is not otherwise available. In cases heard before presiding
officers, the presiding officer conducts the hearing and prepares an .advisory
report which contains findings of fact and conclusions of law and may
contain recommendations for disposition.t 6 The presiding officer files this
report with the hearing commissioner and serves a copy on both the re-
spondent and the enforcement attorney.77
Any party may submit a brief in opposition to or in support of the report
of the presiding officer within five days after service of the presiding officer's
report,t8 and at a later time with the permission of the hearing commis-
sioner.79 When cases are heard by a hearing commissioner, he may permit
the filing of briefs or written argument and specify the time within which
'such brief may be filed.8 0
The Suspension Order: Contents.-If the hearing commissioner determines
that a respondent has violated a rationing regulation or order, he may issue
a suspension order against him.8 ' A suspension order must set-forth the
findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which it is based and must
contain a statement of the reasons )why such an order should be issued, un-
less these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and statement of reasons are
set forth in a separate opinion accompanying the order.8 2 In the event that
a hearing commissioner determines that no suspension order should issue,
he 'may issue either an order dismissing the proceedings or an admonitory
order.88 Once again, if such an order is issued by him, the findings of fact,
76lv. P. R. '4, § 2.12(a).
77REv. P. R. 4, § 2.12(b).
78REv. P. R. 4, § 2.13(a) (b).
79REv. P. R. 4, § 2.13(c).
8ORav. P. R. 4, § 2.14.
8sR]-v. P. R. 4, § 3.1(a).
82 REv. P. R. 4, § 3.1(b).
83Rxv. P. R. 4, § 3.1(c). Under former Procedural Regulation No. 4, it was held
that a hearing commissioner could not issue admonitory letters. Matter of Lassareschi,
Docket No. 8-162 A (November 25, 1943) ; Matter of Bonaccorsi, Docket No. 8-158 A
(November 25, 1943).
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conclusions of law, and the statement of reasons for such disposition must
be set forth in the order or in an opinion accompanying it.84
The requirement that a hearing commissioner must include in a suspension
order his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and reasons for his decision8 5
is not met by a mere recital of the testimony of the witnesses. Even when
there is no material conflict in the evidence, a hearing commissioner must
make findings of fact and conclusions of law, for the reason that the hearing
administrator, on an appeal, is entitled to know the commissioner's view of
the evidence when rendering his decisibn.5s  When the required findings of
fact and conclusions of law are not made, the proceeding will be remanded
for the purpose of preparing such findings and conclusions.8 7
The procedural regulation provides that a suspension order may contain
such provisions as may be deemed appropriate to make it effective.8 8 Fre-
quently, under this section, provisions are inserted in suspension orders
requiring the posting of the suspension order at the respondent's business
establishment during the effective suspension period.8 9 This provision is
not inserted, as charged by the Smith Committee, to "require the merchant
during the period of the suspension to display his 'guilt' to the public at
large in the same fashion as convicts in medieval times were branded or
mutilated for the purpose of drawing public ridicule and contempt." 90 Its
purpose is two-fold: first, to notify the suppliers so that they will not un-
wittingly transfer commodities in violation of the suspension order; and
second, to deter potential customers from making offers to purchase,.by the
acceptance of which the respondent would violate the order.91
84Rav. P. R. 4, § 3.1(c).85RFv. P. R. 4, § 3.1 (b). Matter of Mohican Company, Docket No. 1-3 A (July 20,
1943); Matter of Hart, Docket No. 2-378 A (October 9, 1943); Matter of Jacobson,
Docket No. 2-379 A (October 19, 1943) ; Matter of Siegel and Fried, Inc., Docket No.
2-374 A; Matter of Crabtree, Docket No. 4-495 A (January 8, 1944). It is not neces-
sary that the opiriion or order be subdivided into findings of facts and conclusions
of law if clear findings and conclusions are set forth. Matter of Rowe, Docket No.
5-245 A (March 15, 1944).8GMatter of Schwartz, Docket No. 2-1140 A (December 17, 1943).87Matter of Arkin, Docket No. 2-227 A (October 9, 1943); Matter of LaPorte,
Docket No. 1-144 A (October 18, 1943); Matter of Horvit, Docket No. 2-863 A
(November 19, 1943).88REv. P. R. 4, § 3.1(d).89See Matter of Hill, Docket No. 4-8 A (July 27, 1943) ; Matter of Horvit, Docket
No. 2-863 A (November 19, 1943); Matter of Koceja, Docket No. 6-22 A (November
"20, 1943) ; Matter of National Shoe Stores, Docket No. 2-833 A (November 25, 1943);
Matter of Engetram, Docket No. 6-181 A (Dqcember 7, 1943).
90H. R. RlFP. No. 862, 78th Cong., l't Sess. (1943) 14, 16.
91Matter of Smith, Docket No. 7-94 A (March 28, 1944). In Matter of Fraley,
Docket No. 2-1373 A (February 1944), it was said, "This provision as to posting
obviously is intended to apply only to the premises in which the respondent operates his
1944]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The Suspension Order: Economzic Consequences.-A suspension order is
an economic sanction and therefore economic factors may play an important
part in determining whether such an order should be issued and for what
length of time. The resultant economic hardship, if any, on the community
must be considered and the public interest weighed in the balanc6. An
affirmative duty rests on a hearing commissioner to elicit facts bearing upon
the economic consequences of any order, if such facts are not presented ade-
quately by an enforcement attorney or the respondent.92 Such an order may
be a severe sanction and should not be used in cases of trivial violations.93
As I expressed it on another occasion, "Heavy artillery should not be rolled
out to kill a mosquito.
'94
Distributors of Rationed Goods Strictly Accountable.-Since the purpose
of a suspension order is to allocate away from a violator critical and scarce
commodities, an order can be issued even though -the violations were not
wilful or deliberate. Waste or diversion of rationed commodities may result
as readily from gross carelessness, laxity or indifference as from design.95
A mere assertion by a respondent of lack of knowledge of the regulations will
not excuse his violations, 96 although such ignorance may have a bearing on
the length of suspension.97 Because those who are entrusted with the' distribu-
tion of a rationed commodity have a positive nondelegable duty to distribute
business. If he ceases to rent the premises and does not conduct his business elsewhere
there is no necessity of posting the notice thereafter." See also Gallagher's Steak House,
Inc. v. Bowles, et al., - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), OPA SERVIcE 621:128.
O2Matier/ of Villa, Docket No. 8-3 A (July 29, 1943); Matter of Da Silva, Docket
No. 8-38 A (September 11, 1943); Matter of Tramor Cafeteria, Docket No. 4-18 A
(October 6, 1943) ; Matter of Glosser, Docket No. 2-65 A (October 23, 1943) ; Matter
of Hosti, Docket No. 4-410 A (December 9, 1943); Matter of Dossett, Docket No.
4-461 A (December 1943) ; Matter of Herrin, Docket No. 4-617 A (January 14, 1944).93Matter of Weinziner, Docket No. 2-89 A (November 18, 1943) ; Matter of Leff,
Docket No. 2-617 A (November 19, 1943); Matter of National Shoe Stores, Docket
No. 2-833 A (November 25, 1943) ; Matter of Schull, Docket No. 2-860 A (December 2,
1943) ; Matter of Schwartz, Docket No. 2-1140 A December 17, 1943).9 4Matter of Le Pantis, Regional Docket No. RI-S 100 (Decision of Chief Hearing
Commissioner, Region I, April 2, 1943). /9 5Matter of Firstman, Docket No. 8-41 A (October 8, 1943) ; Matter of Sgriccia,
Docket No. 2-100 A (October 13, 1943); Matter of Petrol Corporation, Docket No.
2-58 A (October 14,, 1943); Matter of Dixon, Docket No. 4-352 A (November 25,
1943) ; Matter of Hosti, Docket No. 4-410 A (December 9, 1943) ; Matter of Marcus,
Docket No. 4-572 A (December 15, 1943) ; Matter of Kravitz, Docket No. 1-258 A
(December 17, 1943) ; Matter of Kruger, Docket No. 4-607 A (December 20, 1943)
Matter of Newman, Docket No. 2-402 A (December 30, 1943).9 6Matter of Vermont Service Stations, Inc., Docket No. RI-S 53 (May 22, 1943);
Matter of Wilemon, Docket No. 5-2 A (July 20, 1943) ; Matter of Harvey, Docket No.
3-56 A (August 31, 1943); Matter of Da Silva, Docket No. 8-38 A (September 11,
1943).9 7 Matter of Vermont Service Stations, Inc., Docket No. RI-S 53 (May 22, 1943);
see text infra at note 113.
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such commodity in strict compliance with the rationing regulations, it has
been held that an employer cannot divest himself of that responsibility by
delegating the operation and management of his business to an employee.
It is the employer, not the employee, to whom is entrusted the rationed
commodity. Although the employer may permit an agent to act as his
alter ego in the administration of his trust, in so doing, he cannot absolve
himself of strict accountability for the performance of his duties.98 This
rule is particularly applicable to a corporate respondent, which if not liable
for the acts of its agents would in most cases be able to avoid responsibility.90
Of course, the untrustworthy employee may likewise be suspended. 100
Suspension Order: Scope.-Since a suspension order allocates away ra-
tioned commodities from unfit persons, it operates in "persoinam and not
in rem. It cannot issue against successors and assigns in the absence of evi-
dence of a scheme or device calculated to evade or circumvent the provisions
of a suspension order.' 0 ' No order may be issued against a party not named
and served, 10 2 nor against a principal stockholder of a corporation merely as
such.'0 3 A suspension order must be in strict conformity to the rationing
regulations. A hearing commissioner cannot substitute his sense of fitness or
preference for established regulations. He does not "have the jurisdiction
9 8
Matter of Morris Loew, Inc., Docket No. 5 S 3 N. Y. (May 20, 1943); Matter of
Schwartz, Docket No. 3-317 N. Y. (June 25, 1943); Matter of Magic Oil Company,
Docket No. 4-20 A (August 13, 1943) ; Matter of Karaty, Docket No. 2-99 A (August
19, 1943); Matter of Tarolongo and Schlomshug, Docket No. 2-25 A (August 19,
1943) ; Matter of Shiland, Docket No. 4-15 A (August 31, 1943) ; Matter of Beaty's
Service Company, Inc., Docket No. 4-47 A (August 31, 1943); Matter of Carolina
Transfer & Storage Co., Inc., Docket No. 4-94 A (September 1, 1943); Matter of
Star Oil Company, Docket No. 4-21 A (September 11, 1943) ; Matter of Fazio, Docket
No. 3-11 A (September 11, 1943); Matter 'of Dunkel Oil Corporation, Docket No.
6-16 A (September 22, 1943); Matter of Perkins, Docket No. 4-45 A (October 18,
1943) ; Matter of Binghamton Giant Markets, Inc., Docket No. 2-832 A (November 6,
1943); Matter of Herrington Oil Company, Docket No. 3-262 A (November 2, 1943) ;
Matter of K & J Markets, Inc., Docket No. 2-10 A (November 20, 1943) ; Matter of
Merit Oil CQmpany, Docket Nos. 1-135 A, 1-165 A (December 31, 1943).99 Matter of Grand Cash Market, Inc., Docket No. 2-5 A (July 22, 1943) ; Matter of
Esterman, Docket No. 2-4 A (July 29, 1943); Matter of Merit Oil Company, Docket
Nos. 1-135 A, 1-165 A (December 31, 1943) ; Matter of Spur Distribution Co., Inc.,
Docket No. 3-448 A (March 18, 1944) ; Matter of Ruiter, Docket No. 3-540 A (March
22, 1944).
'10 Matter of Baltimore Markets, Inc., Docket No. 2-1186 A (December 8, 1943).
'
0 1 Matter of McCraney, Docket No. 4-197 A (November 29, 1943) ; Matter of
Hollingsworth, Docket No. 4-411 A (December 8, 1943) ; Matter of Kramer, Docket
No. 4-644 A (December 23, 1943); Matter of Rountree, Docket No. 4-641 A (Decem-
ber 23, 1943) ; Matter of Schubert, Docket No. 6-147 A (December 15, 1943) ; Matter
of Crabtree, Docket No. 4-495 A (January 8, 1944); Matter of Sears, Roebuck &
Company, Docket No. 4-355 A (February 17, 1944).
'
0 2 Matter of Moore, Docket No. 4-10 A (August 2, 1943).
10 3 Matter of Three Boro Service Station, Inc., Docket No. 36 S 5 C N. Y. (May 24,
1943).
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or power to make a selection on the merits between competing ration plans.
That is a function reserved for the administrative branch of the office.' 0 4
The suspension order must be definite and specific in its provisions as to
time, place, and commodities to which it applies.10 5 It should permit a
respondent to dispose of his stock of rationed commodities on hand, particu-
larly if they are perishable.0 6 No suspension order can be issued for failing
to furnish information required by the Office of Price Administration unless
the allocation is legally conditioned on facts which would be revealed by
the information requested. 0 '7
Length of Suspension Period.-The fact that the length of the suspension
period is not provided for in the regulation has evoked criticism. 0 8 In the
first instance the length of the suspension period is within the discretion of
a hearing commissioner, who hears the testimony, observes the attitude of
the respondent towafds the rationing program, has the 'benefit of argument
of counsel, and is in a position to appraise more carefully the demands of
the public welfare in a particular community.10 9 Where, however, the period
decreed is excessively severe, it will be modified on appeal."10 There are
certain norms governing the length of suspension periods. Long periods of
suspension are entered against those whose past conduct demonstrates such
wilfulness or gross carelessness or indifference as to indicate a likelihood
of future and continuing violations with the consequent deleterious effect
upon the whole rationing program."' Thus, suspension orders for the dura-
tion of the Second War Powers Act are issued for proven black market vio-
lations of a flagrant character. 11 2 Although a suspension order is not issued
104Matter of Toots Shor Restaurant, Docket No. 2-26 A (August 6, 1943).
3O5Beverage Products Co. et al. v. Zweedyke et al, - F. Supp. -, OPA SERViCE
621:119 (W. D. Mich. 1944); Matter of Islon, Docket No. 2-729 A (October 18,
1943) ; Matter of Binghamton Giant Markets, Inc., Docket No. 2-832 A (November 6,
1943).
106Matter of McCraney, Docket No. 4-197 A (November 29, 1943).
10756 STAT. 1078, 5 U. S. C. § 139 f (Supp. 1942); Matter of Parrish, Docket No.
7-45 A .(October 23, 1943).
108Pound, The Challenge of the Administrative Process (1944) 30 A. B. A. J. 121,
123; Committee Report on Office of Administrative Hearings, supra note 10, at 12.
'
09 Matter of Richards, Docket No. 2-18 A (December 30, 1943) ; Matter of Opalenik,
Docket No. 1-387 A (January 5, 1944) ; Matter of Bousquet, Docket No. 1-380 A
(January 5, 1944) ; Matter of Menard, Docket No. 1-373 A (January 5, 1944) ; Matter
of Cordes, Docket No. 2-1291 A (January 22, 1944); Matter of Gaudio, Docket No.
6-276 A (January 22, 1944).11OMatter of Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, Docket No. 4-657 A (Janu-
ary 18, 1944).
"'1Matter of Basse, Docket Nos. 6-132 A, 6-245 A (January 14, 1944).
"12Matter of Schramm, Docket No. 2-34 A (August 2, 1943). It was said in Matter
of Williamson, Docket No. 1-97 A (December 24, 1943), "Duration suspension orders
such as the one issued in this case are reserved as a general rule for black market
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to punish but to withhold allocations of rationed commodities from those
whdse past conduct has proved them to be untrustworthy, it does not follow
that allocations in every case should be withheld for the duration of the
Act. 'Often where the violations are unintentional, unwitting, or the result of
carelessness or laxity, or because of carelessness of employees, a short period
of suspension is decreed. In such cases a suspension period is decreed to
enable the respondent to put his house in order, to indoctrinate his employees,
and to institute a proper and effective system of rationing controls at his
business istablishment to prevent a repetition of the violations.113 4Moreover,
equality of participation on equal terms should be denied violators as a
matter of simple justice to the law-abiding. Merchants who have obtained
more than their proper share quite properly should be required for a time
to forego their allocations, and mark time while their law-abiding competi-
tors catch up.114 Often the proper length of time can be ascertained with
approximate mathematical exactness, as, for example, where a restaurant
owner has overdrawn his ration banking account. A comparison of the
amount of the overdraft with the amount of his weekly allotment will indi-
cate the number of weeks by which the violator has outstripped his competi-
tors. The responsibility for the length of the suspension order lies with the
hearing commissioner. Although recommendations for disposition may be
made by enforcement attorneys or by respondent's counsel, they 'are not
binding on the commissioner. 1 5
It has been previously noted that the rationing powers and the power to
suspend stem from the Second War Powers Act. No jurisdiction exists
operations, and we perceive no reason why it was not properly used in this case. When
dealers in rationed commodities so far ignore their duties and responsibilities under
the rationing regulations as to engage in black market operations, under whatever guise,
their past reputation cannpt justify such conduct or render them immune from the
results of the course of conduct which they deliberately chose to pursue. Such conduct
has no place among dealers permitted to deal in rationed commodities and cannot be
tolerated. Any other holding would tend to wreck the entire rationing program which
is necessary for the continuing successful prosecution of the war, and the fair and
equitable distribution of scarce and critical commodities among the citizens of this
country."
113 Matter of Country Gardens, Inc., Docket No. 4-172 A (October 19, 1943)
Matter of Basse, Docket Nos. 6-132 A, 6-245 A (January 14, 1944) ; Matter of Thames,
Docket No. 4-240 A (October 18, 1943); Matter of Pure Food Market, Inc., Docket
No. 1-134 A (November 25, 1943); Matter of Sunrise Honey Company, Inc., Docket
No. 2-1442 A (February 5, 1944).
14Matter of Bloome, Docket No. 8-196 A (December 1, 1943) ; Matter of Sears,
Roebuck & Company, Docket No. 4-355 A (February 17, 1944); Matter of Crystall
Sugar Company, Docket No. 3-68 A (February 24, 1944).
"15 Matter of Mangiaracina, Docket No. 2-330 A (November 25, 1943); Matter of
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Docket No. 3-447 A (March 9, 1944).
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to suspend for violations in dealing in nonrationed commodities.:" 6 Unlike
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,'117 the Second War Powers*Act
does not prescribe as a condition to the maintenance of a suspension pro-
ceeding that a violator be allowed a "first bite" and a warning to desist.
Therefore, a previous warning has been held not to be a prerequisite to the
issuance of a suspension order."18
Stay of Suspension Order.-For good cause shown, a hearing commis-
sioner may provide in a suspension order that the operation or execution
of such order shall be stayed in whole or in'part for so long as the respondent
shall comply with 'the rationing orders or the conditions set forth in the
suspension order. 1 9 In the event of future violations by the respondent at
a lime when the execution of the order has been stayed and he is on probation,'
power is granted to a hearing commissioner, after the submission of proof
of such violation, to vacate the stay in whole or in part.' 20
Coz.sent Orders.-If the respondent and the enforcement attorney enter
into a stipulation or agreement for the issuance of a consent order, the
hearing commissioner has power to approve such agreement and to issue an
order in accordance with its terms.' 2 ' Each agreement for the issuance of
a consent order is scrutinized with care by the hearing commissioner who
determines whether the agreed order is necessary for and fully protects the
public interest. The issuance of an order based upon such conisent agree-
ment is by no means a mechanical task,' 22 but involves the same scrutiny
and analysis of facts and law as is involved in the issuance of an order
after hearing. No appeal lies from an order issued upon such a consent
agreement.123
Review of Order by Convmzissioner: Original Jurisdiction.-At any time
after an order has been issued by a hearing commissioner from which no
appeal is then pending, either the Government or the respondent may file
an application for modification, vacation, or further hearing.124 The appli-
"16Matter of Griffin, Docket No. 5-150 A (December 18, 1943).
"1756 STAT. 35, 50'U. S. C. § 925(f) (2) (Supp. 1942).
"18 Matter of Jacobson, Docket No. 2-379 A (October 19, 1943); Matter of Cordes,
Docket No. 2-1291 A (January 22, 1944); Matter of Perlin, Docket No. 4-640 A
(January 24, 1944); Matter of Taylor, Docket No. 4-730 A (January 26, 1944);
Matter of Wodman, Docket No. 4-655 A (February 17, 1944).
119 REv. P. R. 4, § 3.2(a).
12OREv. P. R. 4, § 3.2(c).
'
2
'Rav. P. R. 4, § 3.3; Matter of Jay Dee Shoes, Inc., Docket No. 2-1716 A (Decem-
ber 30, 1943).
122Matter of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Docket No.-3-447 A (March 9, 1944).
1 23 REv. P. R. 4, § 3.3.12 4 REv. P. R. 4, § 3.4(a).
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cation may include affidavits or a brief in support thereof and must state
in detail the grounds upon which the order should be modified or vacated.' 25
This application must be served on the opposing party, who, within three
days from receipt of service or such longer period as may be allowed in
the discretion of the hearing commissioner, must file a brief and affidavit
in opposition to the applicants.12 6 After an application for modification is
filed, the hearing commissioner, in his discretion, may stay the execution of
the suspension order pending the determination of the application for
modification.12 7
At any time, except when an appeal is pending or "an order has been en-
tered on appeal by the hearing administratof, a hearing commissioner may
modify or vacate an order previously issued to correct errors of fact or law
disclosed by the record. s8 A hearing is granted on a petition for modifica-
tion upon a showing that the applicant will produce additional material evi-
dence which could not have been produced at the original hearing by the
exercise of reasonable diligence,129 or that changes in conditions or circum-
stances cause the suspension order. to be detrimental to the public interest.3 0
Where a respondent was represented at the hearing by counsel, and the-
evidence was known and available to the respondent at the time of the origi-
nal hearing, a rehearing will not be granted.. 31 Considerably more latitude
is granted where the respondent was not represented by counsel at the
original hearing, 132 although rehearings will not be granted merely because
a respondent, after the issuance of a suspension order, decides he wants to
be represented by counsel.133 When the newly-discovered evidence is relevant
125REv. P. R. 4, § 3.4(b).
'
2 (Rav. P. R. 4, § 3.4(c).
127REV. P. R. 4, § 3.4(d).
1 28 REv. P. R. 4, § 3.5(a).129REV. P. R. 4, § 3.5(b) (1).
130REv. P. R. 4, § 3.5(b) (2). Matter of Security Oil Company, Inc., Docket No.
2-426 A (February 25, 1944).
1alMatter of Mohican Company, Docket No. 1-3 A (August 12, 1943); Matter of
Jacobson, Docket No. 2-379, A (October 19, 1943); Matter of Perlin, Docket No.
4-640 A (January 24, 1944).
132Matter of Figone, Docket No. 8-1 A (July 20, 1943); Matter of Barth, Docket
No. 8-3 A (July 29, 1943) ; Matter of Moore, Docket No. 4-10 A (August 2, 1943).
133Matter of Polasky, Docket No. 3-276 A (December 16, 1943). In that case it
was said by the hearing administrator, "The record shows that respondent was given
a fair and impartial hearing although he was not represented thereat by counsel. The
Hearing Commissioner himself questioned the complaining witness and the respondent
both at length. It is not urged in either the motion for a rehearing or in the notice
of appeal that respondent has any newly discovered evidence or other defense to offer.
Rehearings cannot be granted just because a respondent, after a fair hearing resulting
in a suspension order against him, then decides that he wants to be represented by
counsel. The notice of hearing advised respondent that he could be represented by
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to the issues in the proceeding, a rehearing will be granted.18 4 A petition
for rehearing should state the specific nature of the newly-discovered evidence
and its materiality.'3 5 A hearing commissioner may likewise modify an order
where the refusal to take such action would be wholly inconsistent with the
just and proper disposition of the proceedings.136
Review of Order by Commissioner: Appellate Jurisdiction.-In addition
to this original jurisdiction, hearing commissioners have a minor appellate
jurisdiction. A hearing commissioner can hear an appeal from an order issued
by a Local War Price and Rationing Board or a special hearing officer
suspending consumer rations.13 The appeal is heard in the same manner
as if it, were an original proceeding. 38 In other words, the hearing is a trial
de novo.'3 9 Pending the hearing on appeal, the hearing commissioner may
stay or suspend the operation of an order issued by the War Price and
Rationing Board or the special hearing officer.' 40 The order issued by, a
hearing commissioner upon determination of an appeal supersedes the order
from which the appeal is taken. No further administrative appeal is avail-
able from the order of the hearing commissioner in cases of appeals from
such subordinate officers.
14
'
At any time after the service of the notice of hearing and before the service
of the order of a hearing commissioner, the hearing administrator, after
notice to both parties, may direct that the proceedings be brought before
him and conducted in the same manner as if brought before a hearing com-
missioner. 142 This power, used very infrequently, is designed for the pro-
tection of respondents whose activities cut across regional lines and where
the alleged violation by the respondent affects not only his activities in the
region where the proceeding was commenced, but in other locations as well.
Justice in such cases would seem to iequire that the whole matter be,
adjudicated in one forum so as to avoid subjecting a respondent to numerous
counsel of his own choice at the hearing. He made the election to defend himself with-
out benefit of counsel."
134Matter of Bailey, Docket No. 19 SI-AT (April 24, 1943); Matter of Culpepper,
Docket No. 4-6 A (July 20, 1943).
135Matter of Linderman, Docket No. 37 SG 5 N. Y. (June 25, 1943) ; Matter of
Polulach, Docket No. 6-101 A (November 30, 1943); Matter of Portneuf Co-operative
Association, Inc., Docket No. 7-72 A (December 22, 1943).
'
3 6Rv. P. R. 4, § 3.5(d).
137 REV. P. R. 4, § 4.1(a).
138Rv. P. R. 4, § 4.1(b).
139Matter of Coyle, Docket No. 2-421 A (October 18, 1943). See Wood v. Stewart,
- F. Supp. -, OPA SERvIcE 621:127 (D. C. S. D. Fla. 1943).140 REv. P. R. 4, § 4.1(c).
141REV. P. R. 4, § 4.1(d).
14 2REV. P. R. 4, § 5.1.
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suspension, proceedings involving the same issue. A right is given to any
party to file with the hearing administrator a petition for reconsideration
of any order issued by him in a case brought before him on the party's
own motion.143
Review by Hearing Administrator: Appeal.--Proceedings are reviewed by
the hearing administrator in Washington by two methods. The usual method
of review is by appeal. 'Both the respondent and the enforcement attorney
may appeal to the Office of the Hearing Administrator from any order issued
by a hearing commissioner except a consent order. 144 The Government has
no right of appeal on an order issued after default, although the: respondent
has the right of appeal from an order of a hearing commissioner denying
a petition to reopen a defaulted proceeding.1 45
An appeal is taken by serving a notice of appeal on the hearing commis-
sioner and on the other party to the proceeding within ten days after the
service of the order appealed from.1 46 The time within which an appeal may
be taken may, for good cause shown, be extended by the hearing adminis-
trator.147 This notice of appeal must contain a reference to the findings of
fact, conclusions of law, if any, to which exception is taken, a brief statement
of the grounds for such exception, the modifications proposed with respect
to the order appealed from, and a brief statement of the reasons supporting
such proposed modifications.' 48 Unless the notice of appeal contains such
specifications, the hearing administrator may dismiss the appeal. 149 An in-
tolerable burden would be cast upon the hearing administrator if either of
the parties were permitted to enter a blanket appeal and cause the hearing
administrator to examine a long stenographic record, and often a large
number of exhibits. It is not unreasonable to require an appealing party
to set forth the grbunds upon which the appeal is taken. Within ten days
after the appeal, or such longer period as may be allowed, the appealing
party must file a transcript of the stenographic report of the hearing with
the hearing commissioner. 150
143REv. P. R. 4, § 5.2.
144Rtv. P. R. 4, § 5.3(a).
145REv. P. R. 4, § 5.3(a).
140RFv. P. R. 4, § 5.4(a). A copy of this notice of appeal must be forwarded to the
Office of the Hearing Administrator in Washington, D. C., within five days after taking
the appeal.- Ibid.
'47RV. P. R. 4, § 5.4(a).
148REv. P. R. 4, § 5.4(b) ; Matter of Levine, Docket No. 2-29 A (August 17, 1943);
Matter of Meville, Docket No. 3-335 A (January 18, 1944).
1491Ev. P. R. 4, § 5.4(b).
15 0RE . P. R. 4, § 5.4(c).
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
The taking of an appeal does not automatically stay the operation of the
order appealed from. A hearing commissioner, for good cause, however, may
upon application of any party, stay or suspend the operation of an order
pending the determination of the appeal. If the hearing commissioner does
not act upon such application within three days, or denies such application,
the requesting party may apply to the Office of the Hearing Administrator
for a stay.151
Within three days after the receipt of the notice of appeal or the steno-
graphic transcript, whichever is later, the chief hearing commissioner must
send to the Office of the Hearing Administrator the complete record of the
proceedings, including: The notice of hearing and proof of service thereof;
the request for hearing, if any; the transcript of testimony and all exhibits;
the presiding officer's report and briefs in support or opposition thereto, if
any; the order of the hearing commissioner with proof of service thereof
and the accompanying opinion, if any; the stay order and all petitions, appli-
cations or motions filed and orders issued in the proceeding.152 Thus, the
entire record of the proceeding is forwarded to the hearing administrator.
Any party to an appeal may submit to the hearing administrator a brief
in support of or in opposition to the order of the hearing commissioner. 15 3
The hearing administrator, either upon application or upon his own motion,
may order that oral argument be heard before him, the deputy hearing
151REv. P. R. 4, § 5.5. Dean Pound comments, "Stay pending appeal, without which
it would be of no use, may be had only on order of the Hearing Administrator whose
office is in Washington: After the committee called attention to this, the regional
administrator in one region (embracing Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada,
Arizona, and part of Idaho) was given permission to grant a stay. It is much easier
to get supersedea's in case of a judgment of a federal district court than a stay pending
appeal from the order of a Hearing Commissioner of the OPA." (1944) 30 A. B. A. J.
121, 123. Had Dean Pound relied on the old Procedural Regulation No. 4, his mistake
would have been excusable, since Section 1300.172 of that regulation did provide that
stays should be issued by the hearing administrator. Authority was granted by the
hearing administrator to all hearing commissioners (not to the regional administrator of
one region, as stated by Dean Pound) to grant stays pending appeal. From external
evidence it would seem that Dean Pound relied almost entirely on the San Francisco
Bar Association Committee Report. Had he examined that report more carefully, he
would have discovered such delegation of authority. Committee Report on. the Office
of Administrative Hearings, supra note 10, at 26. In all events, the revised procedural
regulation expressly decentralizes the authority to grant stays.
' 
5 2REv. P. R. 4, § 5.6.15 REv. P. R. 4, § 5.7(a). Matter of Campbell, Docket No. 5-22 A (August 24,
1943); Matter of Altfest & Isaacs, Docket No. 2-693 A (February 9, 1944). Within
ten days after taking the appeal, the appealing party must file his brief with the hearing
administrator. He must serve a copy of the brief on the opposing party. Within five
days after receiving the appealing party's brief, the opposing party may file a counter
brief with the hearing administrator, serving a copy of this counter brief on the other
party also. REV. P. R. 4, § 5.7(b).
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administrator or any assistant hearing administrator.154
The hearing administrator may affirm, reverse, or modify the order of
the hearing commissioner or remand the proceeding with directions.155 In
passing upon an appeal, the hearing administrator will not ordinarily dis-
turb a finding of fact based upon the credibility of witnesses. The hearing
commissioner who sees the witnesses, observes their demeanor on the stand ,
and hears their testimony is in a better position to evaluate their credibility
and to accord to their testimony the weight it merits. 56 Where, however,
an order is based upon confused, indefinite, or questionable testimony, it
will not be allowed to stand.1 5 7 When the order of the hearing commissioner
is based on a record and report of a presiding officer, the former's conclu-
sions do not carry so much weight and the hearing administrator may more
readily substitute his own judgment, for he is in the same position to decide
as the hearing commissioner was. 58
On appeal the hearing administrator is limited to the facts disclosed by
the record and may not base his decision on information obtained from other
sources. 15 9 A respondent is not permitted to make piece-meal appeals. All
alleged errors must be raised in a single appeal. 16 0 It is not the function
of the hearing administrator in a decision on appeal to render advisory
opinions. Questions of law that are not in issue in the proceeding will not
be determined. 161
Review of Proceedings by Hearing Administrator: On His Own Motion.-
So as to prevent a denial of justice by a failure to perfect an appeal within
the prescribed time, the hearing administrator is empowered to review any
case on his own motion,16 2 even including an order issued by a hearing com-
missioner from which an appeal does not lie.'63 A review proceeding of
this nature is conducted in the same manner as an appeal, except that the
154REv. P. R. 4, § 5.8.
155REv. P. R. 4, § 5.9 (a).
15GMatter of Carlos, Docket No. 4-201 A (October 18, 1943); Matter of Baron,
Docket No. 2-710 A (October 30, 1943) ; Matter of 'Yorkville Food Shop, Inc., Docket
No. 2-44 A (November 18, 1943) ; Matter of Hollingsworth, Docket No. 4-411 A
(December 8, 1943) ; Matter of Altfest & Isaacs, Docket No. 2-693 A (January 19,
1944) ; Matter of Cordes, Docket No. 2-1291 A (January 22, 1944) ; Matter of Swerdlin,
Docket No. 2-1444 A (February 5, 1944).
157 Matter of Glick Brothers, Docket No. 2-461 A (October 29, 1943).58 Matter of Gridland, Docket No. 86-85 A N. Y. (April 16 1943).
15 9Matter of Piehovich, Docket No. 8-299 A (March 16, 1944).
GOMatter of Vesely, Docket No. 6-228 A (January 20, 1944).
Ol6Matter of Basse, Docket Nos. 6-132 A, 6-245 A (January 14, 1944).
16 2REv. P. R. 4, § 5.10(a). Matter of Conte, Docket No. 2-96 A (August 4, 1943).
16 3REv. P. R. 4, § 5.10(a).
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time for filing briefs is computed from the time of service of the notice of
intention to review. 1
64
Appeal to Courts.-After the respondent has exhausted his administrative
remedies, he may resort to the courts in a, civil action to restrain the en-
forcement of a suspension order. 165
Conclusio.-This resume, perhaps tedious, of the procedure and practice
of the Office of Administrative Hearings demonstrates, I believe, that not
only are the animadversions directed against it unfounded and unwarranted,
but also that the office has guarded sedulously what Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes has described as "those fundamental requirements of fairness which
are the essence of due process."'166
I submit, in conclusion, that the creation of the Office of Administrative
Hearings, separating functions of adjudication from those of investigation
and prosecution, was a distinct step forward and that its procedure, going
far beyond the bare necessities of due process of law, preserves in fact, as
well as in theory, the basic rights of the citizenry, and at the same time per-
mits expeditious determinations in a war-time economy.
'
64REv. P. R. 4, § 5.10(c).
'65Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U. S. 41, 50, 53 Sup. Ct. 459, 463(1938) ; Walbrick ,v. Brown, - F. Supp. -, OPA 'SERvicE 621:66 (D. C. N. D. Texas
1943) ; Beverage Products Co. et al. v. Zweedyke et al., - F. Supp. -, OPA SERvIcE
621:119 (D. C. W. D. Mich. 1944); Frank v. Bowles, - F. Supp. -, OPA SzRvicE
621:134 (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1944).
166Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1, 58 Sup. Ct. 773 (1938).
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